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We consider an oligopolistic market game. The players are competitors in the same market. At the
beginning of each period, firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and
they decide upon a number of information or advertising signals to be sent into the population in order
to attract customers. The firms know their production and signaling technology,
1 and the price of the
commodity, which is fixed. The consumers in this economy are simulated by a computer program. At
the end of the day, each firm observes only its own market outcomes. Firms do not have any further
knowledge about their environment.
Given this minimal information, the players are not in a position to maximize their profits using
standard optimization techniques. Following Savage’s [1954] terminology, they are in a ‘large
world’.
2 In a large world, the agent’s situation is ill-defined in the sense that he does not have a well-
specified model of his environment. Hence, instead of deducing optimal actions from universal truths,
he will need inductive reasoning; proceeding from the actual situation he faces (see, e.g., Arthur
[1992]). In Savage’s terminology, this is the ‘cross that bridge when you meet it’ principle, which is
also known as ‘adaptive behavior’. We would conjecture that most relevant economic problems, when
considered at a moderately realistic level, are large world problems. The point is not so much that the
agents’ rationality is bounded, but more that their perception is limited (see also Vriend [1996a]). Our
main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players. In particular, we will analyze
the adaptive behavior according to two simple processes; learning direction theory, which has been
successfully applied in various experiments (see e.g., Selten & Stoecker [1986], or Nagel [1995]), and
the well-known method of hill climbing, also known as gradient method. Some other ‘large world’
experiments can be found in Atkinson & Suppes [1958], Witt [1986], Malawski [1990], and
Kampmann & Sterman [1995].
In section 2, we explain how a large world looks like in a small experimental laboratory. In section
3, we present the game-theoretic analysis, and make a first global comparison with the experimental
data. In section 4, we take a closer look at the game as such. Section 5 contains an analysis of the data
for unexperienced players. In section 6, we analyze the differences between experienced and
unexperienced players, and section 7 concludes.
2. The Experiment: Model and Design
We conducted two series of experiments in the computerized experimental laboratory at the
University of Bonn. Before presenting the experimental design, we first explain and discuss the
oligopoly model used.
The Oligopoly Model
1 Notice that we follow the common use of the word ‘signaling’, and not the more restrictive game-theoretic
one related to signaling games.
2 As opposed to the ‘small world’ to which Subjective Expected Utility theory applies.2
A fixed number of firms repeatedly interacts in an oligopolistic market.
3 All firms are identical in
the sense that they produce the same homogeneous consumption good, using the same technology (see
below). Time is divided into discrete periods. At the beginning of each period, each firm has to decide
how many units of the perishable consumption good to produce. The production costs per unit are
constant, and identical for all firms. The production decided upon at the beginning of the period is
available for sale in that period. The firms also decide upon a number of information or advertising
signals to be sent into the population, communicating the fact that they are a firm offering the
commodity for sale in that period. Imagine the sending of letters to addresses picked randomly from
the telephone directory. The costs per information signal sent to an individual agent are constant, and
identical for all firms. The price of the commodity is fixed, invariant for all periods, and identical for
all firms and consumers. The choice of the number of units to be produced, and the number of
information signals to be sent is restricted to a given interval.
Consumers in this economy are simulated by a computer program. In each period, when all firms
have decided their production and signaling levels, consumers will be ‘shopping’, with each consumer
wanting to buy exactly one unit of the commodity per period. In fact, the consumer side is represented
by the following fixed, deterministic demand function. [1]
I + IIa IIb IIc
where,
I = demand directed towards firm i by patronizing consumers
IIa = proportion of signals from firm i in aggregate signaling activity
IIb = proportion of individuals reached by one or more signals
IIc = number of ‘free’, i.e., non-patronizing, consumers
IIa IIb IIc = demand directed towards firm i as a result of current signaling
In each period, a fixed fraction of the number of customers that were satisfied by a given firm during
the last period will patronize that firm (part I of equation [1]). The remaining consumers who received
at least one signal (part IIc multiplied by IIb) are split between the firms, according to the firms’
signaling activity relative to the aggregate signaling in the market (part IIa). Notice that when all firms
signal very little, not all consumers will be reached by an information signal, implying that not all
consumers will actually be present in the market. In Vriend [1996b], in a closely related model, we
consider explicitly a process of sending, receiving, and choosing individual signals, and show that this
leads to a demand function faced by the individual firms that may be approximated by a Poisson
distribution. The deterministic function given above equals the expected value of such a Poisson
distribution. At the end of the period, all unsold units of the commodity perish. Notice that a firm
3 See appendix B for notation and all parameter values used.3
cannot sell more than it has produced at the beginning of the period. Hence, a firm’s profit function
is given by:
, where [2]
The following characteristic of the specific oligopoly model employed merits some discussion.
4 We
have a fixed price, and the consumer side is simulated with a fixed deterministic demand function.
That is, we abstract from the process by which the price was determined, and from the determination
of the market demand at that price level.
5 These two abstractions are made in order to focus on the
behavior of the firms in a relatively stable environment. As we will see in section 4, since the firms
influence each other’s environment, the task of the firm is already rather complicated.
6 Once we have
understood and structured the behavior in such an environment, we can further relax these
assumptions. Note, however, that there are many markets in which goods are sold at fixed prices
(whether as a result of legislation, of vertically imposed restrictive practices, or of optimizing behavior
of the sellers). Clearly, a complete economic analysis would explain such legislation, restrictive
practices, or strategies, by which the prices are fixed, as well. But, as said above, that is not the aim
of this paper. Instead of explaining the price, our analysis focuses on the learning and adaptive
behavior of the firms; and thus applies equally to all the possible ways in which these prices may have
been determined. Given the price level, competition can take place along many dimensions. Competing
for customers through advertising seems a fundamental one. The essential characteristic of most forms
of advertising in a market economy seems that the buyers’ attention is drawn to the fact that someone
is selling something somewhere sometime.
Information for the Individual Players
We now sketch the information that was available to the individual players, distinguishing
technology, market, and experience factors. Appendix A presents the instructions given to the players,
and the table in appendix B summarizes which parameter values were known and which not.
1) The Technology. The players knew that they were identical firms, producing the same
homogeneous consumption good, using the same technology. Both the production and signaling
technology were common knowledge, and the same applies to the price of the commodity. About the
fact that the choice interval for production and signaling was limited, the players was told that “this
is due only to technological restrictions, and has no direct economic meaning”.
4 For a more extensive justification of this type of oligopoly model we refer to Vriend [1996b], and the
references cited therein.
5 Notice that this is perfectly compatible with a standard downward-sloping market demand curve.
6 Here is an illustration. During conversations after the sessions, many players were convinced that aggregate
demand was fluctuating continuously, with only one player saying he was convinced there was a constant
demand function. The experienced players claimed this point slightly less forcefully.4
2) The Market. The players was told consumers in this economy are simulated by a computer
program. They did not receive the specification of the demand function (equation [1]), and they did
not know the number of competing firms,
7 the number of consumers, or the parameter value of the
demand inertia. Instead they were given the following general picture of the consumption side. Each
consumer wants one unit of the commodity in every period. Hence, in each period, a consumers has
to find a firm offering the commodity for sale, and that firm should have at least one unit available
at the moment he arrives. The participants were given two considerations concerning consumers’
actions. First, a consumer who has received an information signal from a firm knows that this firm is
offering the commodity for sale in that period. Second, consumers who visited a certain firm, but
found only empty shelves might find that firm’s service unreliable. On the other hand, a consumer who
succeeded in buying one unit from a firm might remember the good service, and might be more likely
to come back. Participants was also told “experience shows that, in general, the demand faced by an
individual firm is below 1000”.
3) Experience. At the end of the period, each firm observes only its own market outcomes, and
never the actions and outcomes of the other players. Each firm knows the demand that was directed
to it during the period, how much it actually sold, and its profits of that period. Sometimes the market
outcomes are such that a firm makes a loss. A firm making cumulative losses is informed about these.
Each firm faces a known upper limit for the total losses it may realize. A firm exceeding this limit is
declared bankrupt, with the participant removed from the session. This was told before the experiments
started. The players did not know the number of periods to be played, but they knew that the playing
time would be about 2½ hours.
How reasonable is it to assume that firms do not observe the signaling decisions of the other firms?
Notice that the only variable to compete directly with the other firms in this model is the signaling
activity. In reality, competition takes place along many dimensions. Quantity and production capacity
are obvious ones. Product differentiation is another one. The quality of a good depends upon many
aspects, like, e.g., a warranty, add-ons like frequent flyer miles, or an after sale service. Firms also
compete using entry deterring and other restrictive practices, by their choice of technology, location,
or the timing of new product lines. Further competitive variables are the firms’ R&D decision
(including marketing research), and their efforts to build up a reputation. Even advertising as such
comes in many forms, and might be, e.g., informative or persuasive. The bottom line of this partial
list is, that it seems more than plausible that for some of these dimensions the information that an
individual firm has about its competitors is far from complete. Assuming that firms do not observe
the level of their competitors’ signaling activity in our simple model is a first approximation of this
fact.
7 There were at most 12 players at the same time in the lab, but players did not know how many parallel
sessions were going on.5
Given this minimal information provided to a player, he is not in a position to maximize his profits
on the basis of a well-specified demand function. In other words, he finds himself in a ‘large world’,
and must behave adaptively. During the instructions before the games, some players felt uncomfortable
with so much ‘mist’, and most questions attempted to get more knowledge about the environment. The
usual answer to those questions was ‘you just don’t know’.
The Experiments
In the first series, we organized 13 sessions (throughout this paper numbered 1 to 11, plus 91 and
92). In each session, 6 firms were competing in one market, for a total of 78 players. In the second
series, we organized 5 sessions (numbered 21 to 25), with again 6 firms per session, for a total of 30
players. Most players came from various departments of the University of Bonn. The players in the
second series were a sample of experienced players from the first series. In the second series, all
sessions were independent from each other with respect to the experience of the players in the first
series.
8 In sessions with experienced players, there are two options for choosing the parameter setup;
either using the same setup as in the preceding session, or a different parameter setup. The problem
with using the same parameter setup for the experienced players is that a player might have found a
good strategy by chance during the first experiment, without having learned anything general as to
how to play.
9 As we are interested not in specific actions for the game considered, but in adaptive
behavior in this type of environment, we chose the second option.
10 Thus, players in the second series
were experienced in the sense that they might have learned something about the general structure of
the game.
Players sat in front of personal computers, and could not observe the screens of other players.
Appendix A presents an example of a computer screen viewed by a given player. We played about
150 periods with unexperienced players, and 300 with experienced players.
11 There was no time limit
for the participants’ decisions. Each player got a fixed ‘show-up’ fee. In addition, each player was paid
according to the total profits realized by his firm. Losses realized were subtracted from the ‘show-up’
fee. The total payoff for an individual player was given by: α +(α /2000) (points realized).
12 Observe
that bankrupt players had lost their ‘show-up’ fee, and hence got nothing. Each session lasted about
2½ hours, and the average payment over the 108 players was DM 36.42 (≈ $ 24.00).
8 All experienced players in session 21 came from the sessions 1 or 2, in session 22 from sessions 91, 92 or
10, in 23 from 3, 4 or 9, in 24 from 5 or 6, and in 25 from 7 or 11.
9 This problem may be mitigated by giving each experienced player all the statistics of the first series before
the second series starts.
10 See the table in appendix B for the two parameter setups used.
11 All sessions with unexperienced players lasted 151 periods, except for the sessions 7 an 8 (131 periods),
10 (251 periods), and 11 (201 periods). All sessions with experienced players lasted 301 periods. These
differences are mainly due to the fact that sessions 1 to 8 were organized with two sessions simultaneously, and
that the next period could only start when all twelve players had made a decision.
12 The value for α was DM 10 in sessions 1 and 2, 15 in sessions 3 to 6, 20 in sessions 7 to 11, 15 in sessions
91 and 92, 25 in session 21, 7 in session 22, and 13 in sessions 23 to 25, giving an average α of 15.6. The
values for α were varied in an effort to keep average payoffs at a level of about DM 15/hour.6
3. Game-theoretic Analysis and Actual Average Actions and Outcomes
In order to obtain a theoretical benchmark, in appendix C we derive the symmetric stationary
optimal policy for a given player for any given period, assuming complete information about the
demand function and an infinite number of periods, and considering only symmetric optima.
13 The
optimal signaling level for an individual firm is given in equation [3].
[3]
Given the signaling level, the demand for an individual firm is given by equation [1]. The optimal
production level, then, is simply equal to that demand. Before we take a closer look at the game as
such in section 4, we make a first global comparison between this theoretical benchmark and the actual
experimental data.
Observation 1: The average actions actually chosen by both the unexperienced and the experienced
players are close to the symmetric optimal policy, but the differences between the players are
considerable. The average actions chosen by the players get closer to the equilibrium policy as they
play more periods, but the differences between the individual players increase, whereas the differences
between the sessions decrease.
Figures D.1.a to D.1.c in appendix D show the time series for the average signaling, production and
profits of the 66 unexperienced players for the periods 1 to 131, and compare this with the symmetric
stationary equilibrium. Figures D.2.a to D.2.c do the same for the 30 experienced players for the
periods 1 to 301. With the unexperienced players, we observe a steep learning curve in the beginning.
This leads to profits close to the equilibrium level early on. Experienced players happen to start with
production levels closer to the equilibrium level. In both cases we see a lot of fluctuations during most
of the history. And at the end we observe a movement towards the equilibrium levels. Table 1 presents
some ‘snapshots’ of this comparison between the symmetric stationary optimal policy and the actual
average actions played in the game. The numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations. For each
variable we calculate two standard deviations. One based on the averages for each of the 66 individual
13 Notice that the firms are identical, and that the players did not know how many periods the experiment
would last. We do not consider the optimal strategy for the incomplete information game. The literature on
monopolies with uncertain, but linear, demand shows that it is often too complicated not only to determine the
optimal pricing strategy (in order to maximize the discounted sum of profits) but also to establish convergence
as such (see, e.g., Kiefer & Nyarko [1989]). Basically, the reason is that for each action there is a trade-off
between the payoff a firm gets in the form of information which may lead to future profits, and payoff in the
form of immediate profits. As Kirman [1993] argues, trying to incorporate this problem into an oligopolistic
model, in which there is also strategic interaction, seems for the moment unmanageable (see also, e.g., Green
[1983], or Kirman [1983]). Also in the literature on double oral auctions with private information, it is the
complete information outcome that is used as the theoretical benchmark (see Davis & Holt [1992]). Clearly, this
is not a normative benchmark, but merely a yardstick.7
players, and the second based on the averages per session. We will come back to the differences
between the individual players in section 5. Notice that the variance across sessions is rather small,
and much smaller than across subjects, especially in the last 50 periods.
sign. (s.d.) prod. (s.d.) profit (s.d.)
unexperienced:
equilibrium 927 118 14.3
period 1 864 (1016/480) 616 (443/205) -107.6 (120.1/73.2)
period 1-50 882 (867/163) 160 (121/13) 5.8 (23.3/11.3)
period 81-130 938 (954/113) 133 (125/6) 8.1 (18.9/9.2)
experienced:
equilibrium 687 232 25.1
period 1 959 (1234/319) 306 (344/61) -109.0 (176.4/84.1)
period 1-50 727 (713/110) 254 (251/13) 5.8 (38.7/23.0)
period 81-130 715 (790/78) 247 (279/8) 11.5 (32.7/15.9)
period 251-300 698 (925/78) 241 (311/6) 17.6 (32.9/14.1)
Table 1 comparison equilibria, averages and standard deviations
4. A Closer Look at the Game
Besides the minimal information, there are two additional aspects of the structure of this game that
are worth noticing. First, there is a positive feedback mechanism. A fixed proportion f of a firm’s
satisfied customers will patronize the next period. Hence, firms having sold more in period t, will get
more customers in period t+1, and the other way round. This positive feedback has two effects. First,
it makes the game complicated from the individual player’s point of view, and second, it may give
rise to lock-in effects in both directions. If we take the symmetric equilibrium strategy given in section
3 for the unexperienced players, each firm sends 927 signals, and receives 118 customers in a given
period t. Of those 118 customers, if satisfied, 0.56 118 will come back in period t+1, 0.56
2 118
in period t+2, etc. In other words, the signals sent in a given period t lead to new customers arriving
in the form of a wave, with a steep front, that fades out gradually. As a result, in any period t, the
demand faced by a firm is composed as follows: 52 customers are there because of a signal received
in period t, 0.56 52 because they had reacted to a signal in period t-1, 0.56
2 52 because of a signal
in period t-2, etc., up to 1 customer still coming back since period t-8.
The lock-in effect can be made visible as follows. For a given period, for a given firm, one can
calculate for each possible (production, signaling)-pair the immediate profits that pair would realize,
taking as given the signaling activity of the other firms, and the sales of all firms in the preceding
period. Hence, we draw a 3-D ‘immediate profit landscape’, showing all points that lead to positive
immediate profits as an ‘island’. If, on the one hand, firms invest in order to build up a market, this
island will grow. On the other hand, a firm’s market may collapse if it does not signal enough. For
example, it may be tempting for players to seek maximization of their immediate profits, i.e., to search
for the peak in their immediate profit landscape. What would happen then? Analyzing every single8
instance in which an individual player had to make a decision, it turns out that very often the global
maximum of immediate profits is a corner solution with signaling at zero and production equal to the
demand generated. This is the case in 84% of the times in the first series of experiments, and 91% of
the times with experienced players. Hence, if a firm would try to maximize its immediate profits, its
market will shrink away under its own eyes in most cases. An example of this effect is shown in
figure 1, where the dot indicates the action chosen by the player considered, and where the other





















































































Figure 1 shrinking through immediate profit maximization
Figure 2 shows an example within the same environment of the opposite positive feedback effect,






















































































Figure 2 market build-up through sales maximization, with immediate profits>0
A second aspect of this game that is worth to be stressed is the influence that each player’s actions
have on the outcomes of other players. While one firm might try to walk up to a peak in its profit
landscape, this landscape is deformed continuously by the other players who might be trying to reach
their peak. This coevolutionary process can be seen as a number of players walking simultaneously
on one rubber mattress. Figure 3 shows an example, where the aggregate number of signals sent by
each of the other players fluctuates from 750 to 1300 to 200. The interaction between the firms
through the aggregate signaling activity shows up in the form of noise for an individual firm. If a firm
has a larger immediate profit island, it will be less vulnerable to this noise in the sense that it will less
easily lead to negative profits. This is because the firm’s action can be farther away from the sea, and9
its island jumps up and down less than smaller islands. As far as occasional negative profits induce





















































































Figure 3 fluctuations through actions other players
5. Data Analysis: Unexperienced Players
Given the minimal information about their environment available to the players, they are not in a
position to specify the demand function. Hence, a player is not able to maximize his firm’s profits
directly with standard techniques. As their problem situation is ill-defined, they must learn and behave
adaptively. As observed in section 3, the players learn to choose actions that are on average close to
a symmetric equilibrium, but there are large differences between the actions of the players. Figure 4
shows the distribution of the individual unexperienced players’ signaling and production levels,
averaged over the periods 81-130. The arrow indicates the symmetric equilibrium given above. The
straight line with slope (p-c)/k serves as a benchmark. All combinations of production and signaling
above it necessarily lead to negative profits. If every unit produced is actually sold, the net revenue
is given by the price minus production costs per unit, multiplied by the production level: (p-c) z.
















Figure 4 distribution actions unexperienced players, periods 81-13010
This leads to two questions. First, how do these differences in actions correspond to differences in
performance? Second, how, then, do we arrive at this distribution? In other words, in what sense does
the behavior of some players differ from that of other players?
Observation 2: There are considerable differences in performance among the players. We can
distinguish three categories of players. Category I: the successful players, Category II: the ‘nil players’,
and Category III: the unsuccessful players. The category II players choose relatively low signaling and
production levels, and realize profits close to zero. Just like the category I players, the category III
players try higher signaling (and production) levels than the category II players, but they are less
successful than the category I players.
A method to measure the difference in performance among the players is calculating a Gini coefficient
(see, e.g., Case & Fair [1996]). A Gini coefficient measures the skewness in the wealth distribution
of a population, using the Lorenz curves. If the poorest x% of a population has x% of the total wealth
of that population for each 0≤ x≤ 100, we have an equal distribution, characterized by a Gini coefficient
equal to 0. If the richest person in the population has 100% of the total wealth, the Gini coefficient
will be 1. The Gini coefficient for the 66 unexperienced players is 0.41.
14 Given this unequal
performance, what does the distribution look like, and what is its relation to the actions chosen? In
figure 5.a we order all 66 unexperienced players on their cumulative profit realized per period, and
in figure 5.b we present for these same players their average signaling.
15 Although these categories
can be identified easily visually, they can be derived formally as follows. Having ordered all players
on their average profits, calculate average signaling for each player, consider any two possible
boundaries yielding three categories, and take those boundaries for which the difference between the
average signaling in the middle category and the other two categories combined is maximized.
16 We
will use these three categories in our subsequent analysis, to see whether we can identify differences
in the behavior between these three groups of players. The numbers in figure 5.a and 5.b give the
values of profits and signaling respectively for the observations next to the boundaries.
14 In order to allow for a comparison between the different sessions, we consider the same number of periods
played for each session, i.e., 131. The wealth for a player is the cumulative profits realized plus the initial 2000
points he could loose before going bankrupt. Hence, bankrupt players have an accumulated wealth of zero. The
Gini coefficients per session are available upon request.
15 The averages are taken over the periods that a player was active, i.e. until he went bankrupt or the end of
the session was reached. Adding production levels would yield little extra information since average production
and signaling are almost perfectly correlated.











13 8 5 6 6 6
players
avg. profit
0.19 0.15 -3.84 -4.18








13 8 5 6 6 6
players
avg. signaling
775 391 138 2574
Figure 5.b average signaling
Table 2 illustrates this categorization further by giving the average signaling, production, and profit
levels per category as shown in figures 5.a and 5.b. We use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(Wilcoxon test from here on) to analyze whether the signaling levels of the individual players in the
three categories are drawn from the same population. The alternative hypotheses are that the signaling
level is stochastically higher for category I than for category II players (significant at 0.0% level),
lower for category II than for category III players (significant at 2.6%), and different for category I
and category III players (significant at 5.0%).
players # players signaling production profits
all 66 951 160 4.0
cat. I 37 1301 194 16.6
cat. II 18 290 49 -1.4
cat. III 11 857 225 -29.5
Table 2 averages for the three categories
The question, then, is where these differences between the players’ actions and outcomes come
from.
17 First, we take a look at the players’ decisions in the very first period, and we analyze whether
there is a significant correlation between the individual players’ experience during the initial periods
and their experience during later periods.
Observation 3: Both production and signaling levels in the first period are concentrated on focal
points. And the individual players’ sales in later periods are positively correlated with their sales in
the initial periods. The correlation coefficient between the 66 individual players’ average sales levels
in the periods 1-10 and the periods 81-130 is 0.55 (significant at 0.0% level; 1-sided t-test).
17 The production and signaling technology are characterized by constant marginal costs. Hence, any firm size
might seem efficient, and an unequal distribution of firm sizes would not be surprising. Notice, however, that
the demand equation [1] implies that the marginal revenue of a signal sent is not constant, and depends upon
the firm size.12
In the first period the players have very little information to guide their decisions. Nevertheless, these
choices are far from uniformly randomly distributed over the relevant choice domain. First, we look
at production. The choice domain ranges from 0 to 4999, but the players was told that the demand
faced by an individual firm would in general be below 1000. Only 6 players (9%) choose production
levels greater than 1000. 61 out of 66 players (92%) choose a multiple of 50, and 53 (80%) pick
production levels that are multiples of 100. The favorite multiple of 100 is 500, chosen by 13 players
(20%), followed by 800 (7 players, or 11%), and 1000 (6 players, or 9%). Thus, as observed in many
other experiments the midpoint is a focal point (see, e.g., Ochs [1994] on coordination games). Next,
we look at signaling. 61 players (92%) choose multiples of 50 or 100, and 55 (83%) multiples of 100,
the most frequently chosen being again 500 (8 players, or 12%).
The correlations between the players’ initial and later experiences are further illustrated by table D.1
in appendix D, where we give for each unexperienced player his initial period actions and outcomes,
and his averages over his whole playing history. The question one has to address is, once observed
such a correlation, where does it stem from? In section 4 we identified various positive feedback
mechanisms in our experiment. Let us see how they can be related to these positive correlations
between initial and later sales. First, we showed the temptation to maximize immediate profits by
choosing signaling equal to zero, with production greater than zero. In that way, a firm’s costs would
be greatly reduced because there are no signaling costs, with the patronizing customers showing up
‘for free’, but a consequence would be the shrinking of its pool of customers, with negative effects
on later sales and profitability. How often did the players follow this strategy? And are there
differences between the categories?
Observation 4: Shrinking the customer pool by not signaling is done regularly by players in all three
categories. But there are differences between the categories. Category III players are much more
inclined to eat drastically into their customer pool than category II players, who are in turn much more
inclined to do this than category I players.
Table 3 illustrates this. Notice that category III players do this in more than 10% of their decision
periods, that this is almost 6 times as often as category I players, and more than twice as often as
category II players. We use the Wilcoxon test to analyze whether these levels of the individual players
in the three categories are drawn from the same population. The alternative hypotheses are that
shrinking occurs less often for category I than for category II players (significant at 0.9% level), less
often for category II than for category III players (significant at 4.0%), and less often for category I
than for category III players (significant at 0.0%). Recall that category III players signal on average
much more than category II players. That is, they counter the shrinking of their customer pool by extra13
signaling in the periods following it. This aggressive ‘on-off’ signaling behavior might be one of the
explanations for their low profits.
18
players # obs. shrinking rel. frequency
all 10174 391 3.8
cat. I 5877 107 1.8
cat. II 3078 156 5.1
cat. III 1219 128 10.5
Table 3 shrinking customer pool by not signaling, with production>0
A second positive feedback effect presented in the previous section was related to the fact that small
firms would more easily get negative profits. Players on small islands get wet feet easily. Clearly,
positive and negative profits are only relative. However, when profits are negative a player has always
the option to play (0, 0) for (signaling, production). Since that leads to a sales level of zero, and no
patronizing customers, it implies a strong negative lock-in effect.
Observation 5: Voluntarily, i.e., excluding bankruptcy cases, switching to inactivity is predominantly
done by players after observing a loss in the preceding period. There are differences between the
categories. Category II players are more skeptical about their opportunities than the other two
categories. They switch most easily to inactivity. Once voluntarily inactive, the probability to stay
inactive the next period is much higher than the probability of returning into business, with category
I players least likely to return into business.
Table 4 illustrates the voluntarily switching to inactivity.
19 Considering the individual players, only
1 player out of 66 switches to inactivity less often after a loss than otherwise. Using the Wilcoxon test
to analyze whether the switching-to-inactivity frequencies of the individual players in the three
categories are drawn from the same population, we find that category II switch to inactivity more often
than category I players (significant at 0.0% level), category II switch to inactivity also more often than
category III players (significant at 2.4%), whereas there is no significant difference between category
I and category III players.
18 It is not that players deliberately making themselves bankrupt increase these frequencies for category III
players. In fact, leaving the bankrupt players out would give an even higher average frequency for shrinking for
category III players (11.0%).
19 Recall that category III players realized lower average profits than category II players.14
# observations rel. frequencies (%) inactivity
players profit<0 profit≥ 0 after profit<0 after profit≥ 0
all 3434 6308 1.7 0.1
cat. I 1470 4334 0.5 0.0
cat. II 1349 1427 3.4 0.4
cat. III 615 547 1.1 0.4
Table 4 relative frequency switching to voluntary inactivity
One can also look at it from the other side. Once switched to inactivity, how often does a player
decide to come back into business? Table 5 illustrates this. In 84% of the cases voluntarily inactive
players remain inactive in the next period. Comparing the frequencies of returning into business by
the individual players in the 3 categories, players in category I return less often into business than
category II players (significant at 0.9% level with 2-sided Wilcoxon test). The differences between
category I and category III players, and between category II and category III players are not
significant. Perhaps the fact that the probability to return is the lowest for category I means that these
players almost never choose inactivity, but when they do it, they are slightly more serious about it.
absolute frequencies rel. frequencies (%)
players back into business stay inactive back into business
all 59 307 16.1
cat. I 5 31 13.9
cat. II 46 238 16.2
cat. III 8 38 17.4
Table 5 frequencies returning into business after choice of inactivity
After analyzing the players’ actions in these particular cases, we now turn to an analysis of the
players’ behavior in a more general sense. Some recent models of adaptive learning and evolutionary
dynamics in the economics literature are, for example, Ellison [1993], Kandori et al. [1993], and
Young [1993]. Marimon [1993] discusses the basic properties of such dynamic models. In the
evolutionary dynamic models mentioned, adaptive behavior is basically a one-step error correction
mechanism. The agents have a well-specified model of the game, they can reason what the optimal
action would be, given the actions of the other players, completely independent from any payoff
actually experienced, and they play a best-response strategy against the frequency distribution of a
given (sub-)population of other players. The evolutionary dynamics consist of a co-evolutionary
adaptive process, players adapting to each others’ adaptation to each other ..., plus experimentation in
the form of trembling. In our game, the scope of such ‘supervised’ learning techniques is very limited.
The agents do not have a well-specified model of their environment, and they do not know which
action would be the best response. Hence, the very first task for our players, is to learn what good
actions would be. As shown in the formal game-theoretic analysis, in case of complete information,15
the only choice variable for a firm is the number of signals to be sent, whereas production should be
simply adjusted to the demand generated by these signals. This suggests a 2-step decision problem for
the players in our experiment. The first step concerning the number of signals to be sent, and in the
second step adjusting the production level to the level of the demand generated. We will first analyze
this second step.
Production: Learning Direction Theory
Given the demand generated by a players’ signals sent in the current and previous periods, the
production level that would yield the highest profit would be equal to this demand. We conjecture that
the players use a simple algorithm to achieve this. This is sometimes known in the experimental
literature as ‘learning direction theory’ (see, e.g., Selten & Stoecker [1986], or Nagel [1995]). It is
perhaps best illustrated by the following example given in Selten & Buchta [1994]: “(C)onsider the
example of a marksman who tries to shoot an arrow at the trunk of a tree. If he misses the trunk to
the right, he will shift the position of the bow to the left and if he misses to the left, he will shift the
position of the bow to the right. The marksman looks at his experience from his last trial and adjusts
his behavior according to a simple qualitative picture of the causal relationship between the position
of his bow and the path of the arrow.” (Selten & Buchta [1994], p. 9). As we see, learning direction
theory is based on the idea that the structure of the payoff function is known by the player, and can
be exploited. Given an action, and the corresponding feedback from his environment, it is assumed
that the player has enough knowledge of the structure of the game to reason in which direction better
actions could have been found. Notice that the feedback is not necessarily the specific value of the
payoff generated. The player is supposed to move directly in his choice parameter space. It is not
necessary for learning direction theory to be applicable that a player knows exactly where the optimum
is. Often only the direction is known. Therefore learning direction theory concerns only a qualitative
learning mechanism.
20 Notice that although, on the one hand, the theory offers only a general
qualitative prediction, it is, on the other hand, very precise in the following sense. It predicts a player’s
action on the basis of his action and outcome in the last period alone.
In our game, this direction learning mechanism can be applied as follows. If a firm faced more
demand than it had produced, it knows that a higher production level would have led to higher profits.
And if a firm faced less demand than it had produced, it knows that a lower production level would
have led to higher profits. Therefore, in our model learning direction theory would lead to the
predictions given in table 6. Notice that if production and demand were equal, the theory does not
predict the direction of the change in production. Remember that, given the 2-step model (setting
signals and adjusting production), these predictions are for a given demand level. Clearly, as we will
20 Notice the similarity with supervised learning algorithms (see Vriend [1994] for a discussion). With
supervised learning it is not assumed that the player himself knows where the better actions are, but it is a
supervisor who tells the player where the optimal action would have been. Also most supervised learning
algorithms assume a gradual change in the right direction only.16
analyze below, the demand depends upon the signaling level. Therefore, here we only consider those
cases in which the players did not move into the opposite direction with their signaling level.
21
if then
productiont < demandt productiont+1 ≥ productiont
productiont > demandt productiont+1 ≤ productiont
productiont = demandt n.a.
Table 6 predictions learning direction theory
Observation 6: The players change their production level into a direction that would be wrong
according to learning direction theory in only 9% of the cases where it makes a prediction. But there
is an asymmetry in the success of learning direction theory between the cases where production was
too low, and where it was too high. This asymmetry seems related to the fact that the players are less
boundedly rational than this theory assumes, and this applies in particular to the category I players.
Figures 6.a and 6.b summarize how far learning direction theory predicts correctly, distinguishing the
cases of too high and too low production in the preceding period, and distinguishing the three
categories of players. If production was too low (1250 observations), learning direction theory made
a wrong prediction in only 3% of the cases. If production was too high (4571 observations), the
relative frequency of wrong predictions was 11%. The weighted average of these two gives the 9%


























































Figure 6.a direction learning






























































Figure 6.b direction learning
after production > demand
21 That is, if an increase in production is predicted there should be no decrease in signaling, and the other way
round. This condition was satisfied in 63% of the cases. If we neglect this condition on signaling, considering
the three categories together, the percentages for decrease, unchanged, and increase would be 5, 11, and 84 for
the case that production was less than demand, and 47, 31, and 23 for the case that production was greater than
demand.17
Remains the question how to explain the asymmetry between the cases where production was too low,
and where it was too high in the preceding period. Learning direction theory makes the prediction on
the basis of the last period. The reasoning of the players is supposed to be boundedly rational in that
it only considers what would have been a better action. That is, it is ex post. In our formal analysis
we explained that the demand was generated by a fixed deterministic demand function. Since this was
not known to the players, there was subjective uncertainty. The problem for the players is not so much
to maximize what their profit could have been (ex post), but to maximize their expected profits (ex
ante). If demand is uncertain, and rationing is not all-or-nothing, some overproduction may be
profitable. That is, the production that maximizes expected profits may be higher than the expected
demand. Given the signaling level, the demand q faced by an individual firm is a stochastic function
with p.d.f. f[q]. Hence expected profit E[Π ] for a given output level z is:
E[Π (z)] = p { Σ q
z
=0 q f[q] + z Σ q
∞
=z f[q]} - c z - k s. As can be easily shown:
∆ E[Π ]/∆ z=p (1-F[z])-c. Hence, expected profit is maximized when F[z] = 1-c/p. That is, F[z]>0.5 if
c/p<0.5, which was the case with both unexperienced and experienced players. In other words, the
ex ante optimal production level is higher than the ex post average demand. And the lower the
marginal costs of production, the more overproduction is profitable. This explains the asymmetry in
the learning direction results given above. Players appear more reluctant to decrease their production
level when it was too high, because they understand that production should be higher than average
demand. That is, the players are less boundedly rational than learning direction theory assumes.
Checking the players one by one, we find that 58 out of 66 subjects more often follow the learning
direction theory hypothesis in the case that production was less than demand, than in the case in which
production was higher than demand. Also it turns out that all players on average overproduce; with
the overall average production 1.20 times average demand.
22
But in figures 6.a and 6.b we see also some differences between the categories, as far as the
propensity to follow the learning direction theory hypothesis. Comparing the frequencies of increasing
production after production was less than demand (figure 6.a), players in category II increase their
production less often than category I players (significant at 3.1% level with 1-sided Wilcoxon test).
The difference between category II and category III players is not significant, and also the fact that
category III players increase their production less often than category I players is significant only at
the 7.6% level. Looking instead at the frequencies of decreasing production after production was
higher than demand (figure 6.b), players in category II decrease their production more often than
category I players (significant at 1.0% level with 1-sided Wilcoxon test), and also less often than
category III players (significant at 1.1%). The difference between category I and category III players
22 In all the sessions, there is exactly one player who is an exception to this. The average production for this
experienced player was 0.998 times his average demand. He was an extreme direction learner. Out of 221
decisions, he never went into the wrong direction with his production level.18
is not significant. Hence, it seems category I players understand best the desirability of overproduction,
while category II players understand this least well, and as a result become more easily small players.
Signaling: Hill Climbing
As said above, the adaptation of the production level is assumed to take place for a given demand
level. Since this demand is generated eventually by the signals sent, it is time to turn to an analysis
of the number of signals sent. Notice that learning direction theory cannot predict much with respect
to signaling. In the case that demand was higher than production, a firm knows that a lower signaling
level would have given higher profits, but it does not know what the optimal signaling level would
have been. However, in case production was higher than demand faced, a firm does not even know
whether a higher signaling level would have led to higher profits. Perhaps even lower signaling levels
would have given higher profits. And also when the demand faced by a firm equals its production, it
does not know in which direction to adjust its signaling. In our closer look at the game in section 4,
we showed that a player’s opportunities could be depicted as a hill. The objective of a player is to find
the top of the hill. A problem for a player is that he does not know how his hill looks like, and the
hill may be changing all the time. A simple way to deal with this problem would be to start walking
into some direction, if one gets a higher payoff one continues from there, otherwise one goes back to
try another direction. Eventually one should reach a top.
23 We conjecture that the players’ adaptive
behavior in signaling space can be described by such a hill climbing, or gradient, algorithm.
In order to explain the essence of hill climbing, and the difference with learning direction theory,
let us continue the example of the marksman trying to hit the trunk of a tree. Now, assume that the
marksman is blind-folded. After each trial the only feedback he gets from his environment is the level
of enthusiasm with which the crowd of spectators reacts. The closer he gets to the optimum, the louder
they are expected to shout. Therefore, after each two trials he can compare the levels of payoff, and
decides to try next time in the neighborhood of the one where the yelling was loudest. In other words,
if an action leads to a worse outcome than the previous one, it is rejected as a new starting point. Hill
climbers do not use any knowledge of the structure of the game, or of the payoff function. They are
myopic local improvers, walking blindly in the direction of the experienced gradient in their payoff
landscape. Hence, hill climbers rely completely upon the contours of the payoff landscape, whereas
direction learning takes place directly in the space of actions. A deterministic variant of hill climbing
would give the predictions presented in table 7.
23 This might be a local top only. Simulated annealing is a one step more sophisticated variant of hill climbing
in that it tries to avoid getting stuck at local optima. To achieve this, the algorithm accepts with some probability
downhill moves, whereas uphill moves are always accepted. Since we do not have landscapes with local optima,
we do not consider simulated annealing.19
if then
(1) signalingt < signalingt-1 and payofft < payofft-1 signalingt+1 > signalingt
(2) signalingt < signalingt-1 and payofft > payofft-1 signalingt+1 < signalingt-1
(3) signalingt > signalingt-1 and payofft < payofft-1 signalingt+1 < signalingt
(4) signalingt > signalingt-1 and payofft > payofft-1 signalingt+1 > signalingt-1
(5) signalingt = signalingt-1 or payofft = payofft-1 n.a.
Table 7 predictions hill climbing
Before analyzing how far the players were hill climbers, we need to define the payoffs that form the
hill. The islands shown in section 4 were for immediate profits. But as argued already there, given the
dynamics of the demand generated by the signals sent and the patronizing customers, a player should
look further ahead. Above we showed that players could boost their immediate profits by signaling
very little, i.e., by eating into their pool of customers. Future profits are adversely affected by this. The
cause is that of all the customers satisfied in a given period, some fraction will come back ‘for free’
in the next period, i.e., without the need to send them a signal. A firm can also forego some current
profits by investing in the buildup of a pool of customers. The higher the current sales level, the better
the firm’s future profit opportunities, which was visualized by a larger island in section 4. Hence,
when considering the question how well a firm performed in a given period, one should not only look
at its immediate profits, but also at the change in its current sales level. The value of serving additional
customers now (besides the immediate profits) is the profits that can be extracted from them in later
periods.
24 Since patronizing customers come back ‘for free’ (without needing a signal), the profit
margin for those customers will be the price minus the unit production costs of the commodity.
Formally, the lookahead payoff in a given period is: Π + ∆ x( p -c) Σ t
∞
=1 f
t. In our analysis of hill
climbing, we will distinguish both the case in which players take into account this lookahead payoff,
and the case in which players go myopically for their immediate profits only. Notice that since the
players do not know the value of the patronage parameter f, nor the exact specification of the demand
function, a priori they are not in a position to calculate the altitude of their lookahead hill explicitly.
But during the game they can learn about the value of looking ahead. Hence, without specifying here
the exact learning mechanism through which they may have learned this value, we consider the
question how often the players do behave ‘as if’ they are hill climbing having learned these lookahead
payoff values correctly.
24 There is also an indirect effect related to a change in the player’s sales level. It will change the number of
‘free’ consumers for which the player’s signals compete with the other players’ signals. This indirect effect will
be relatively small because it is spread over the six firms (they compete for the same pool of free consumers),
and will be ignored here.20
Observation 7: Players adjust their signaling level in a way that is wrong according to the hypothesis



































Figure 7.b lookahead hill climbing
Figures 7.a and 7.b give the percentages of correct and wrong predictions by the hill climbing
hypothesis for myopic and lookahead climbing.
25 The numbers in parentheses on the horizontal axis
denote the ‘if ...’ conditions as given in table 7. The light shaded bars give the frequencies when the
hill climbing prediction was strictly correct. The dark shaded bars give the frequencies with which
players choose signaling in period t+1 equal to signaling in period t. Notice that for conditions (2) and
(4), those cases are already included in the strictly correct predictions. In the conditions (1) and (3),
according to the hill climbing hypothesis, a player should reverse the direction of the change in his
signaling level, whereas it would be strictly wrong to continue moving into the same direction that led
to a decrease in payoffs. The inertia indicated in the figures by the dark shaded bars is not exactly
predicted by the hill climbing hypothesis, but it is also not strictly wrong according to that hypothesis.
Moreover, there might be good reasons for this inertia. First, players might keep their signaling level
constant for a period, in order to adjust their production level according to the rules suggested by the
learning direction theory discussed above. Second, given the noise caused by the other players, it
might be wise not to put all weight on the last period alone. This suggests that a further refinement
of the modeling of the players’ behavior could be obtained, by considering algorithms taking into
account more periods, like reinforcement learning (see, e.g., Roth & Erev [1995]).
Observation 8: There is an asymmetry between the cases when a player’s payoff had increased and
when it had decreased. When things are going well, a player will not easily switch into the wrong
direction with his signaling. When, on the other hand, a player’s payoff is decreasing, he is more likely
to continue into the wrong direction with his signaling.
25 Notice that if a player had not changed his signaling level during the last two periods, or if his payoff had
not changed, there is no gradient, and hill climbing cannot be applied. This is condition (5) in table 7, and
occurred in 33% of the cases. The absolute frequencies for the cases (1) to (4) in figure 7.a are 560, 2311, 2997,
and 810. In figure 7.b these frequencies are 1305, 1583, 2121, and 1710.21
For convenience, we consider here only lookahead hill climbing. Compare in figures 7.a and 7.b the
relative frequencies of wrong predictions for cases (1) and (3) with cases (2) and (4). In cases (1) and
(3), the player’s payoff had gone down. Hence, continuing to change his signaling level in the same
direction would be wrong (29% of the times this happened). In cases (2) and (4), the player’s payoff
had increased. Hence, going back to his previous signaling level and then moving into the opposite
direction would be wrong (21% on average). We used a sign test to analyze whether individual players
were more likely to go into a wrong direction in the cases (1) and (3) than in the cases (2) and (4).
For 43 out of 66 subjects this was the case (significant at 1.0% level; 1-sided). We conjecture that the
fact that unsuccessful courses of actions are more easily continued, than that successful ones are
reversed, is a more general psychological feature.
As we see, figure 7.a and 7.b are very similar. A first explanation is the following. Analyzing all
cases in which a player had changed his signaling level, it turns out that in 71% of the cases the
payoff gradient happens to be in the same direction for myopic and lookahead hill climbing. That is,
in those cases the player’s immediate profits as well as his lookahead payoff (taking into account also
the future profits related to his current sales level) had increased, or both had decreased. Hence, we
now consider only the other 29% cases of opposite gradients. The question is, which players tend to
go for the immediate profits, and which players look more often ahead?
Observation 9: Category I players look ahead most often. Category II players are the least frequently
looking ahead.
Table 8 shows the frequencies. As we see, on average players are inclined just a little bit towards
looking ahead. And this is a second explanation why the myopic and lookahead hill climbing pictures
in figures 7.a and 7.b look so similar. We also observe that the differences in frequencies between the
categories are not large. Category II players look ahead less frequently than category I players
(significant at 0.9%; 1-sided Wilcoxon test), and also less frequently than category III players
(significant at 9%). There is no significant difference between category I and category III players.
Hence, category II players are the most myopic, not putting enough resources into building their
market, and this partly explains why they are small players.
absolute frequencies rel. frequencies (%)
players myopic lookahead lookahead
all 1094 1243 53.2
cat. I 595 747 55.7
cat. II 383 364 48.8
cat. III 117 132 53.0
Table 8 frequencies myopic vs. lookahead hill climbing22
We have seen that the 2-step model we proposed does not perfectly describe the behavior of the
players, and there are important differences between the players. But at the same time, the attraction
of the model is that it is simple. A question, then, is whether this simple model would generate a
pattern of behavior of the players that would converge to the same average level as observed in the
experiments. To answer this question, we consider an unrefined numerical model, in which we use
learning direction theory for the players’ production decision, and hill climbing for their signaling
decision. We start with all players choosing the average production and signaling level observed during
the experiments in the first period, and restrict their choices to the same domain. Players follow the
learning direction theory hypothesis for production as outlined above, where the size of their step is
a draw from a N(0,5) distribution, and they do not change their production level if their signaling
decision for that period points into the opposite direction. The step size in their hill climbing for
signaling is also stochastic, using a N(0,10) distribution for the noise around the new starting value,
but always such that they stay at the correct side of the discarded signaling value that led to the lower
payoff. All players are modeled identically, but independently, which implies that their paths may
diverge over time due to the stochastic factors. In figure 8 we present the average behavior of 11
simulated sessions with 6 players, and the average signaling levels observed in the experiments. It
should be stressed that the two curves have a different time scale. The main thing to notice is the















Figure 8 simulation 2-step model vs. experimental data
6. Data Analysis: What Have the Experienced Players Learned?
In this section we turn to an analysis of the experienced players. The basic question we want to
address is: what have they learned? Before considering the specifics of the sessions with experienced23
players, a relevant question is which players came back.
26 In other words, how far had the players
discovered whether the game was worthwhile?
Observation 10: The group of players that came back has a selection bias. The better their average
profit as unexperienced player, the more likely they were to come back. None of the four bankrupt
players came back. Survival as an unexperienced player did not guarantee survival as an experienced
player (five went bankrupt). But the players who got experienced in the strongly reduced strategy
space (999 instead of 4999 as maximum values for signaling and production) were at a disadvantage.
Table 9 show the percentages of players that came back, and those that did not, per category.
27 We
use a χ
2-test to compare the probability for category I players to come back with this probability for
category II and III players combined. Category I players appear much more likely to come back, but
due to the small number of observations this is significant only at the 9.3% level. This seems an
example of reinforcement learning. They tried the game as an unexperienced player, and the higher
the payoff realized, the more likely it is to play again.
28
absolute frequencies rel. freq. (%)
players yes no yes
all 30 48 38
cat. I 22 26 46
cat. II 5 13 28
cat. III 3 9 25
Table 9 which players came back
Just like with the unexperienced players, we can distinguish three categories of players: the successful
ones, the ‘nil players’, and the unsuccessful ones. With the unexperienced players we had one
treatment (sessions 91 and 92) in which there was a strongly reduced strategy space: 1000 instead of
5000. Four of the players of those two sessions came back. As unexperienced players these four would
have been all four category I players, but as experienced players they ended up all four in category
III, and two of them went bankrupt. This suggests that the other players have learned something in
the larger strategy space that turned out useful as experienced players.
Recall that the only difference in the setup with the experienced players is that we changed the
parameter values (see table B.1 in appendix B). Everything else, also in the instructions, remained the
same. We explained this to the players. Hence, we had a game with the same structure, but with
different numerical values. The reason was that we are interested in the question whether the players
26 We tried to get all players back. First, they got a letter inviting them to participate in a similar experiment,
and a couple of days later we contacted them all by phone.
27 Including the sessions 91 and 92.
28 Garvin & Kagel [1994] also find that aggressive, unsuccessful players are less likely to play again.24
had learned something of the general structure of the game, and not whether players that had happened
to find good actions as unexperienced players would simply continue to choose those specific numbers.
A first question, then, is whether the players understood right from the start that their opportunities
were different in a quantitative sense.
Observation 11: The experienced players’ choices for production and signaling levels are less
concentrated on focal points than with the unexperienced players. But that is not because the players
simply continue with those values they had learned during the game as unexperienced players.
The production level chosen in the very first period is again rarely greater than 1000; only 2 players
(7%) against 1 unexperienced (3%). Multiples of 50 are again popular (22 players, or 73%). But
multiples of 100 are less popular with experienced players (17 players, or 57%) than with
unexperienced (23 players, or 77%), which is a difference significant at 10% (χ
2-test). The most
chosen production levels are 100 (4 times), 200 (3), and 300 (3). Hence, the midpoint of 500 has no
focal point character anymore for production levels. This is a significant difference with the
unexperienced players at 1.0% (χ
2-test). With respect to signaling, multiples 50 and 100 are still
chosen often (25 times, or 83%, and 18 times, or 60%). The most chosen signaling levels are 300, 500,
1000 (3 times each, or 10%). Concerning the ratio between signaling and production, with
unexperienced we had 16 players out of 30 (53%) who choose signaling greater than production, while
24 experienced players (80%) choose signaling greater than production. This is significant at 3.0% (χ
2-
test). Thus, they have learned that signaling is relatively important.
The correlation coefficient between the numbers learned as unexperienced players (taking for each
individual player his average signaling in the last 50 periods), and the values chosen in the initial
period as experienced players is only 0.14 and not significant (t-test).
29 Hence, already in the first
period, the experienced players understand that the different parameters imply different opportunities.
Table D.2 in appendix D gives the initial period actions and outcomes for the experienced players, as
well as their later averages. The next question then is, how well do the players on average discover
these changed overall market opportunities during the experiment? And is their market experience
during the initial periods again an important factor explaining their performance in later periods?
Observation 12: Also for the experienced players there is a significant positive correlation between
sales in the initial periods and sales in later periods. The correlation coefficient between the 30
individual players’ average sales levels in the periods 1-10 and the periods 81-130 is 0.57 (significant
at 0.0% level; 1-sided t-test), and even between sales levels in the periods 1-10 and the periods
251-300 there is a positive correlation (coefficient of 0.37; significant at 2.2%).
29 Including the sessions 91 and 92.25
Next, we turn to our 2-step model of learning direction theory for production, and hill climbing for
signaling. Do the experienced players behave differently? And in particular, we want to know whether
the players have learned to look ahead more often than before.
30
Observation 13: The experienced players adaptive behavior as described by our 2-step model is similar
to that of the unexperienced players.
With respect to the learning direction hypothesis concerning the adjustment of the production level,
there is little difference between unexperienced and experienced players. Unexperienced adjusted their
production level into the wrong direction in 11.4% of the cases, and experienced in 9.5%. Using the
Wilcoxon test to analyze whether these levels of the individual players are drawn from the same
distribution for unexperienced and experienced players, we find that the null hypothesis ‘no difference’
cannot be rejected. The frequencies with which the experienced players tend to climb hills are similar
to those for the unexperienced players. They go into a strictly wrong direction with signaling in 28.5%
of the cases, compared with 24.2% for the unexperienced for lookahead hill climbing. Using the
Wilcoxon test as above, this difference is not significant. And there is also no significant difference
between the unexperienced and experienced players as far as their inclination to look ahead is
concerned (Wilcoxon test); 54.3% for unexperienced against 54.2% for experienced in those cases in
which the payoff gradient for immediate profits and the one for immediate plus future profits pointed
into a different direction.
In section 5, we showed that although average actions were close to the equilibrium ones, there were
strong differences between the individual players. Since the experienced players came from different
sessions, the following two questions arise. First, did the experienced players have a significantly
different background? And if so, second question, does this imply differences for their behavior as
experienced players?
Observation 14: There were differences in the players’ experience as far as their environment was
concerned. And players that got their experience in a more cooperative environment tend to play more
cooperatively as experienced players.
Table D.3 in appendix D gives the average signaling per period per player for each of the 11 sessions
with unexperienced players. Clearly, in some sessions there was more aggregate signaling than in other
sessions. If players signal very little, not all potential customers might be reached, and some might not
30 To avoid selection bias, when comparing with the unexperienced players, we consider here only those 30
unexperienced players that came back. This also implies we now include the four players of sessions 91 and 92
that came back, and that were excluded in the analyses in the previous section. More details concerning this
comparison are available upon request.26
show up. But very soon almost all customers are reached.
31 If firms were cooperative, they could
keep signaling low, but each individual firm would have an incentive to increase its signaling. Hence,
we can see the average signaling level in a session as a measure of cooperation among the firms in
that session. What is the effect for the individual firms of this level of average signaling? Whatever
their sales level, an increase in the aggregate signaling implies that the signaling costs per unit of sales
go up. There are two causes for this. First, a firm’s sales go down. Second, when a firm reacts,
increasing its signaling, its signaling costs go up. Take as an example the two sessions 1 and 9. In
session 1 the average signaling per firm was 690, whereas it was 1043 in session 9. The result of this
aggressive competition in session 9 was that the signaling costs per unit sold were much higher. This
applies approximately equally to all players in a session, whatever their size. On average signaling
costs per unit of sales were 0.47 in session 1 (with a minimum of 0.37, and a maximum of 0.49), and
0.71 in session 9 (ranging from 0.68 to 0.82). Since there are also costs of unsold stocks, in session
9 the aggressive signaling environment makes that the profit margin was almost completely eroded,
and it was difficult to make positive profits.
The question, then, is whether this different background implies differences for their behavior as
experienced players? Table 10 shows the average signaling per firm for the sessions with experienced
players, the numbers of the sessions where they had got their experience, and a weighted average of
the average signaling activity in those sessions.
32 The correlation coefficient between the measure of
cooperation as unexperienced and as experienced is 0.94 (significant at 2.9%; 1-sided t-test).
session avg. sign. from sessions weighted avg. sign.
experienced experienced unexperienced unexperienced
21 592 4x#1, 2x#2 755
23 770 2x#3, 1x#4, 3x#9 1005
24 666 2x#5, 4x#6 945
25 769 3x#7, 3x#11 1023
Table 10 influence environment on cooperation
7. Conclusions
Notwithstanding the minimal information the players were provided with, on average they learned
to choose actions that were close to the symmetric stationary equilibrium for the complete information
variant of the game. There were, however, important differences between the players; both with respect
31 With average signaling of 359 per firm, 95% of the customers will be reached, and with 552 signals per
firm this is 99%. The symmetric stationary equilibrium strategy implies sending 927 signals per firm. The
aggregate effect of the last 375 of these signals per firm is that three additional customers will be attracted to
the market.
32 We omit here session 22 because 4 players came from sessions 91 and 92, in which production and
signaling had an upper limit of 999 instead of 4999. That is, they had got their experience in a different
environment anyway, independent from their own attitude towards aggressiveness or cooperation.27
to their actions and to their payoffs. In particular, we distinguished three categories of players: the
successful ones, the ‘nil players’, and the unsuccessful players.
The actions and outcomes in the initial period turned out to be important for the players’ later
performance. We analyzed how this was related to some of the positive feedback mechanisms present
in the market, and how the different categories of players dealt with these more or less successfully.
Based on the game-theoretic analysis, we proposed a 2-step model, in which the players use their
signaling level as the basic strategic variable, whereas they adjust their production level towards the
demand thus generated. It seems fair to conclude that learning direction theory, combined with the
qualification concerning the ex ante optimality of overproduction, gives an accurate description of the
players behavior as far as their production levels is concerned. The hill climbing hypothesis with
respect to the players’ signaling level was slightly less accurate, and made wrong predictions in about
a quarter of the cases. In particular we detected an asymmetry in the players’ behavior. When payoffs
were increasing, players tend to continue their course of action. But when payoffs were decreasing and
the players should reverse the direction their signaling was moving into, they often continued walking
downhill. This might be a more general psychological feature. We also showed that inertia in the
players’ behavior was important. This suggests that a further refinement of the modeling of the
players’ behavior could be obtained, by considering algorithms taking into account more periods than
the most recent alone, like e.g. reinforcement learning (see Roth & Erev [1995]).
33 Using the hill
climbing hypothesis, we analyzed how far the players were inclined to go myopically for immediate
profits, or looked further ahead. All players were only slightly more inclined to look ahead, and this
was true above all for the successful players. A numerical exercise showed that the simple model
seems to offer a reasonable explanation for the average market outcomes.
We showed that the group of players that came back as experienced players had a clear selection
bias; with the successful players being almost twice as likely to play again. The experienced players’
initial period actions had a different distribution than the unexperienced one, which suggests that they
have learned something, but they did not simply start with those values they had learned as
unexperienced players. With respect to our 2-step model, the experienced players’ behavior was not
significantly different from that of the unexperienced. We showed that competitiveness of the
environment in which the players got their experience had a significant influence on their behavior as
experienced players.
33 One of the first problems, then, is how to reduce the choice set of the players (see, e.g., Holland et al.
[1986]). Much more progress needs to be made here.28
Appendix A. Instructions, and Computer Screen
Table A.1 contains the English version of the instructions given to the players.
Actors:
* Each of you will be a firm in a market economy.
* The consumers in this economy are simulated by a computer program.
Each day:
* In the morning, firms decide:
- Identical firms decide upon a number of units of a perishable consumption good (each firm the same good).
- The production of each unit costs 0.25 point.
- The production decided upon at the beginning of the day is available for sale on that day.
- Experience shows that, in general, the demand faced by an individual firm is below 1000.
- The firms also decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population, communicating the fact
that they are a firm offering the commodity for sale on that day. Imagine the sending of letters to addresses picked
randomly from the telephone book.
- Sending one information signal to an individual agent always costs 0.08 point.
- The price of the commodity is 1 point. The price of the commodity is given, it does not change over time, it is equal
for all firms and consumers, and known to all agents.
- It is not possible to enter values greater than 4999 for the number of units to be produced and the number of
information signals to be sent. This is due only to technological restrictions, and has no direct economic meaning.
* During the day, consumers are ‘shopping’:
- When all firms have decided their actions, consumers will be ‘shopping’. Each day, each consumer wishes to buy
exactly one unit of the commodity. Hence, consumers have to find a firm offering the commodity for sale, and such
a firm should have at least one unit available at the moment they arrive.
- We give you two considerations concerning the consumers’ actions:
a A consumer that has received an information signal from you knows that you are a firm offering the commodity for
sale on that day.
b Consumers who visited you, but arrived too late and found only empty shelves might find your service unreliable.
On the other hand, a consumer who succeeded in buying one unit from you might remember the good service.
* At the end of the day, each consumer and each firm observes his own market outcomes:
- Consumers turn home satisfied or not, i.e. with or without a unit of the commodity.
- All unsold units of the commodity perish.
- Each firm will know the demand that was directed to it during the day, how much it has actually sold (notice that
it cannot sell more than it has produced at the beginning of the day), and its profits of that day.
- It cannot be excluded that sometimes the market outcomes are such that a firm makes a loss. Each firm faces an
upper limit of 2000 points for the total losses it may realize. A firm exceeding this limit will be declared bankrupt,
implying that it will be forced to inactivity from then on.
- A firm might have received some information signals sent to random addresses by other firms. These information
signals will be listed (senders and numbers of signals), using fictitious names for the sending firms.
Time:
* There is no time limit for your daily decisions. From day 20 on, you will hear a warning sound when you are using more
than one minute decision-time.
* The playing-time will be about 2½ hours.
Payment:
* Each player will be paid according to the total profits realized by its firm.
* Each player gets a ‘show-up’ fee of DM 20.-.
* In addition, the payoff will be DM 10.- for each 1000 profit points realized.
* Note that losses realized will be subtracted from the DM 20.-.
* Bankrupt players have lost an amount of DM 20.-, and hence get nothing.
Anonymity:
* A player will never know the actions and outcomes of other players.
Keyboard:
* To confirm your choice: Enter [< ]
* To delete: Backspace [<--]
* Please, before confirming your choices, always make sure that you did not make a typing-error.
Table A.1 instructions to the players29
Figure A.1 shows the computer screen as viewed by a player acting as firm ‘X’ in a given period.
Figure A.1 computer screen firm ‘X’
Firm "X": RESULTS day 7
ACTIONS OUTCOMES
------------------------------- -----------------------------------
production signaling demand sales profits
123 450 114 114 47.25







Firm "X", please enter your choices
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B. Notation, Variables, and Parameter Values
Table B.1 gives the notation used throughout the paper. Superscripts will be used for the time index, and
subscripts for the identity of a firm. In addition, the table gives an overview of the parameter values used. The
last column indicates whether the parameter value was known or not to the players. Recall that in addition to
these parameter values, the players did not know the functional form of the demand.30
unexperienced experienced
symbol meaning (1-10, and 91-92) (21-25) known
c ‘marginal’ cost production 0.25 0.27 yes
f patronage rate satisfied consumers 0.56 0.63 no
g price minus ‘marginal’ cost production 0.75 0.73 yes
k ‘marginal’ cost signaling 0.08 0.21 yes
m # firms 6 6 no
n # consumers 712 1422 no
N total # agents 718 1428 no
p price of the commodity 1.00 1.00 yes
Π profit - - own
q demand directed towards a firm - - own
Q aggregate demand - - no
s # signals sent by a firm - - own
- maximum value for s 4999
34 4999 yes
S aggregate # signals all firms - - no
S− aggregate # signals other firms - - no
V value - - no
x sales - - own
z production - - own
- maximum value for z 4999
35 4999 yes
- # periods ± 150 ± 300 no
Table B.1 notation and parameter values
Appendix C. Game-theoretic Analysis
The profit function is given by: , where: ,
and: .
The demand function is deterministic. Hence, z=q=x. Assuming the game is played for T periods, the value V
of an action in any period T-t’-1 equals the sum of the immediate profits in period T-t’-1 and the value V in
period T-t’: . Hence, the first-order condition is:
. We will now consider these two terms separately.
34 Two sessions (91 and 92) were played in which the players faced an upper limit of 999 instead of 4999 for
their production and signaling decision variables. Unless otherwise noticed explicitly, these two sessions are
excluded from the analyses.
35 999 in sessions 91 and 92.31
Determination of first term: The profit function can be rewritten as: ⇒
. Neglecting the term [1-exp(-S/N)], and the roundings and truncations, demand is
given by: ⇒ . Since all
consumers visit a firm: . Hence, we get: ⇒
.
Determination of the second term: . First-order condition:
⇒⇒
⇒ . We know:
. Hence: . Since , we get
. Since
, we get: ⇒ .
More in general: , where: , ,32
and: ⇒⇒
.
Combining the two terms we get:
⇒
⇒
. Now consider the difference equation
, which can be solved as: . Hence,
assuming the game is played an infinite number of periods, the optimal action in a given period is:
.
Appendix D. Some Additional Data
Figures D.1.a to D.1.c present the time series for signaling, production, and profits for period 1 to 131
averaged over the 66 unexperienced players. Figures D.2.a to D.2.c do the same for the 30 experienced players
for periods 1 to 301. In all these graphs, we took a five period moving average for presentational reasons, and
we added the equilibrium levels as a first benchmark. In the graphs for signaling (D.1.a and D.2.a) we added
two other benchmarks. The first one is called ‘losses’, and corresponds to the line drawn in figure 4. It is the
signaling level beyond which positive profits are impossible, given the equilibrium production level. The second
additional benchmark is called ‘99%’, and corresponds to the average signaling level needed to make sure that














Figure D.1.a average signaling














Figure D.2.a average signaling









Figure D.1.b average production









Figure D.2.b average production













Figure D.1.c average profits













Figure D.2.c average profits
experienced players, periods 1-301
The following table D.1 presents the individual averages and first period actions for unexperienced players. The
averages are taken over the periods that a player actually played. Table D.2 present analogous data for
experienced players. Table D.3 gives the session averages. Those averages are taken over the periods that the
session lasted.34
period 1 all periods number also
session player prod. sign. sales prod. sign. sales profits periods session player
1 1 0 100 0 154 868 144 35.9 151 21 2
1 2 400 200 91 215 1096 192 50.4 151 21 1
1 3 500 500 228 197 1045 180 47.4 151 21 4
1 4 250 400 183 131 393 64 0 151 21 5
1 5 100 100 46 129 715 118 28.9 151 - -
1 6 20 5 2 467 161 35 -94.9 22 - -
2 1 1199 2199 522 362 2309 315 39.8 151 - -
2 2 300 100 24 38 78 10 -6.1 151 - -
2 3 200 0 0 207 1348 163 3.4 151 - -
2 4 600 400 95 83 540 70 6.6 151 - -
2 5 600 100 24 163 986 134 14 151 21 3
2 6 350 150 36 12 52 6 -1 151 21 6
3 1 1000 1500 113 138 827 99 -1.8 151 - -
3 2 600 800 91 124 846 100 1.5 151 23 3
3 3 800 4800 216 9 54 5 -2 151 - -
3 4 1200 2000 129 335 2574 286 -4.2 151 - -
3 5 1000 800 91 36 170 20 -2.7 151 23 2
3 6 200 200 72 213 1699 192 2.6 151 - -
4 1 500 1500 153 429 2893 406 67.8 151 23 1
4 2 1000 1000 124 439 820 78 -97 28 - -
4 3 500 500 95 26 147 20 2.2 151 - -
4 4 2000 2000 182 344 710 99 -44.2 68 - -
4 5 900 400 89 50 298 40 4 151 - -
4 6 100 50 69 202 1268 171 19.1 151 - -
5 1 500 2000 285 356 2805 330 16.8 151 - -
5 2 700 600 85 29 138 14 -3.8 151 - -
5 3 500 600 85 86 505 52 -10.3 151 - -
5 4 500 700 100 44 280 30 -3.3 151 24 6
5 5 500 500 71 229 1841 211 6.6 151 - -
5 6 400 600 85 97 527 56 -10.8 151 24 4
6 1 1200 800 185 107 618 85 8.8 151 24 3
6 2 800 400 92 112 691 90 6.4 151 - -
6 3 550 500 116 391 2627 340 32.3 151 24 2
6 4 400 300 69 6 20 3 -0.1 151 - -
6 5 500 800 185 168 1228 142 2.2 151 24 5
6 6 234 234 54 113 272 37 -12.6 151 24 1
7 1 250 150 35 58 457 50 -1.1 131 - -
7 2 600 900 207 138 991 118 4.4 131 25 3
7 3 400 400 92 274 2109 243 6.2 131 25 1
7 4 50 100 23 38 289 32 -0.5 131 - -
7 5 2000 500 115 43 134 17 -4.3 131 - -
7 6 800 1000 230 259 2230 232 -11.2 131 25 6
8 1 875 900 117 94 430 76 18.1 131 - -
8 2 1000 100 13 173 962 135 14.5 131 - -
8 3 500 500 65 77 299 62 18.8 131 - -
8 4 400 500 65 350 1836 289 55 131 - -
8 5 900 990 128 28 121 20 3.1 131 - -
8 6 2255 2500 324 154 705 116 21 131 - -
9 1 800 2000 334 95 540 64 -2.9 151 - -
9 2 300 100 17 39 246 27 -2.3 151 - -
9 3 200 600 100 269 2246 250 2.6 151 23 5
9 4 500 1000 167 295 2394 270 4.6 151 23 6
9 5 50 50 8 9 54 5 -1.2 151 - -
9 6 750 500 84 103 775 88 0.2 151 23 4
10 1 800 400 55 16 84 10 -0.9 251 - -
10 2 100 300 41 99 668 87 9.1 251 22 6
10 3 800 3000 414 265 1934 246 24.6 251 - -
10 4 500 750 104 79 565 64 -1 251 - -
10 5 350 400 55 354 2377 293 14.7 251 22 5
10 6 300 300 41 3 11 1 -0.4 251 - -
11 1 800 1000 63 57 391 46 0.1 201 25 4
11 2 1000 3500 222 363 2667 316 11.9 201 25 5
11 3 500 450 28 255 1419 149 -28.4 84 - -
11 4 500 4999 316 86 656 74 -0.2 201 - -
11 5 1000 1000 63 117 912 107 4.3 201 25 2
11 6 300 300 19 101 842 96 3.6 201 - -
Table D.1 summary data unexperienced players35
period 1 all periods number also
session player prod. sign. sales prod. sign. sales profits periods session player
91 1 0 67 0 180 396 84 7.4 151 - -
91 2 0 1 0 77 82 19 -7 151 - -
91 3 10 30 10 197 827 184 68.7 151 - -
91 4 300 100 84 209 892 193 69.4 151 22 3
91 5 50 50 42 164 750 152 51.3 151 22 2
91 6 25 1 1 78 281 64 21.6 151 - -
92 1 10 40 10 215 900 186 60.4 151 22 1
92 2 100 120 64 224 942 202 70.6 151 - -
92 3 14 10 5 121 581 109 32.4 151 - -
92 4 100 150 79 170 713 149 49.8 151 - -
92 5 500 500 265 29 30 11 1.5 151 22 4
92 6 100 200 100 62 184 43 13.3 151 - -
Table D.1 (cont.) summary data unexperienced players
period 1 all periods number also
session player prod. sign. sales prod. sign. sales profits periods session player
21 1 300 300 134 153 364 141 23 301 1 2
21 2 100 50 22 232 587 224 38.4 301 1 1
21 3 250 300 134 111 282 107 17.8 301 2 5
21 4 850 1800 805 800 2010 784 145.6 301 1 3
21 5 130 150 67 124 298 111 15.1 301 1 4
21 6 25 100 25 4 9 3 -0.5 301 2 6
22 1 120 300 55 199 631 182 -4.1 301 92 1
22 2 50 100 18 146 431 125 -5.2 301 91 5
22 3 1200 4999 919 416 1410 385 -23 92 91 4
22 4 1000 1250 230 236 268 77 -43 49 92 5
22 5 100 1000 100 937 2805 865 23.2 301 10 5
22 6 50 50 9 357 1245 329 -29.3 71 10 2
23 1 200 500 90 726 2320 718 34.9 301 4 1
23 2 30 3000 30 416 1644 377 -80.2 25 3 5
23 3 1100 3000 537 665 2058 594 -18.1 113 3 2
23 4 100 350 63 205 665 199 3.6 301 9 6
23 5 20 60 11 66 215 63 -0.3 301 9 3
23 6 50 1000 50 162 510 154 3.6 301 9 4
24 1 11 17 4 69 126 45 0.1 301 6 6
24 2 400 4000 400 1012 2697 911 72 301 6 3
24 3 800 600 158 25 46 17 0.4 301 6 1
24 4 60 50 13 16 38 12 0.2 301 5 6
24 5 30 90 24 112 323 99 0.8 301 6 5
24 6 300 500 132 271 765 253 19.1 301 5 4
25 1 300 500 133 75 218 66 -0.5 301 7 3
25 2 100 1000 100 285 951 280 3.8 301 11 5
25 3 400 1500 399 429 1398 420 11.3 301 7 2
25 4 700 1500 399 272 834 257 8.1 301 11 1
25 5 200 660 175 173 548 166 4.3 301 11 2
25 6 200 50 13 212 667 201 3.4 301 7 6
Table D.2 summary data experienced players36
period 1 all periods number
session prod. sign. sales prod. sign. sales profits periods
1 212 218 92 149 690 117 25 151
2 542 492 117 144 886 116 9 151
3 800 1683 119 143 1028 117 -1 151
4 833 908 119 157 846 116 9 151
5 517 833 119 140 1016 116 -1 151
6 614 506 117 150 909 116 6 151
7 683 508 117 135 1035 115 -1 131
8 988 915 119 146 726 116 22 131
9 433 708 118 135 1043 117 0 151
10 475 858 118 136 940 117 8 251
11 683 1875 119 139 1010 117 1 201
21 276 450 198 237 592 228 40 301
22 420 1283 222 255 773 230 -1 301
23 250 1318 130 241 770 231 5 301
24 267 876 122 251 666 223 15 301
25 317 868 203 241 769 232 5 301
Table D.3 session averages
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